Flow: Separating Consensus and Compute -- Block Formation and Execution by Hentschel, Alexander et al.
Flow: Separating Consensus and Compute
– Block Formation and Execution –
Dr. Alexander Hentschel
alex.hentschel@dapperlabs.com
Dr. Yahya Hassanzadeh-Nazarabadi Ramtin Seraj
yahya@dapperlabs.com ramtin.seraj@dapperlabs.com
Dieter Shirley Layne Lafrance
dete@dapperlabs.com layne@dapperlabs.com
Abstract
Most current blockchains are built as a homogeneous system, comprised of full nodes, which
are responsible for all tasks: collecting the transactions, block formation, consensus, and trans-
action execution. Requiring all full nodes to execute all tasks limits the throughput of exist-
ing blockchains, which are well documented and among the most significant hurdles for the
widespread adoption of decentralized technology [1, 2, 3].
This paper is a follow-up on our previous proof-of-concept, Flow [4], a pipelined blockchain
architecture, which separates the process of consensus on the transaction order from transac-
tion computation. As we experimentally showed in our previous white paper, this provides a
significant throughput improvement while preserving the security of the system. Flow exploits
the heterogeneity offered by the nodes, in terms of bandwidth, storage, and computational ca-
pacity, and defines the roles for the nodes based on their tasks in the pipeline, i.e., Collector,
Consensus, Execution, and Verification. While transaction collection from the user agents is
completed through the bandwidth-optimized Collector Nodes, the execution of them is done
by the compute-optimized Execution Nodes. Checking the execution result is then distributed
among a more extensive set of Verification Nodes, which confirm the result is correct in a dis-
tributed and parallel manner. In contrast to more traditional blockchain architectures, Flow’s
Consensus Nodes do not execute the transaction. Instead, Verification Nodes report observed
faulty executions to the Consensus Nodes, which adjudicate the received challenges and slash
malicious actors.
In this paper, we detail the lifecycle of the transactions from the submission to the system
until they are getting executed. The paper covers the Collector, Consensus, and Execution role.
We provide a protocol specification of collecting the transactions, forming a block, and executing
the resulting block. Moreover, we elaborate on the safety and liveness of the system concerning
these processes.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
07
40
3v
1 
 [c
s.D
C]
  1
8 F
eb
 20
20
Contents
1 Introduction 4
1.1 Architecture Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Design Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1 Safety and Liveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Flow’s Roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4.1 Collector Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4.2 Consensus Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4.3 Execution Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.4.4 Verification Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.5 States, Staking, and Slashing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2 Preliminaries 11
2.1 Adversarial Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.2 HotStuff . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Distributed Random Beacon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.1 DRB Random Generation Phase (Threshold Signatures) . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.2 DRB Setup Phase (Distributed Key Generation) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4 Distributed Random Beacon Setup in Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3 Collection Formation 17
3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Cluster Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.3 Transaction submission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4 Collection Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.5 Liveness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
4 Block Formation 25
4.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2 Data Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.3 Block formation process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.3.1 Block Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.3.2 Block Proposal Evaluation and Voting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3.3 Finalizing a Proto Block . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.3.4 Source of randomness Attachment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.4 Protocol State Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.5 Adjudicating Slashing Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.6 Correctness Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5 Execution 32
5.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
5.2 Collection Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.3 Block Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
5.3.1 Execution Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2
5.3.2 Specialized Proof of Confidential Knowledge (SPoCK) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.3.3 Execution Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
5.4 Correctness Proof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
6 Mitigating Attack Vectors 40
6.1 Byzantine Clusters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
6.2 Faulty Computation Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Acknowledgments 41
References 41
3
1 Introduction
1.1 Architecture Overview
In most conventional blockchains, all the operational tasks are executed by full nodes, i.e., each full
node is expected to collect and choose the transactions to be included in the next block, execute the
block, come to a consensus over the output of the block with other full nodes, and finally sign the
block, and append it to the chain. The structure resembles the single-cycle processing architecture
of the early computers, where one instruction (i.e., block) is executed per step. On the other hand,
the pipelined structure offered by Flow resembles the pipelined architecture of modern CPU design.
While some unit of Flow is executing the current block, the pipeline architecture allows another
unit to generate the next block, which results in an improvement over the throughput.
In contrast to the majority of existing blockchains, which operate on the assumption that nodes
are homogeneous, Flow considers resources heterogeneous in their network bandwidth, computa-
tion power, and storage capabilities. The Flow blockchain is built on a diverse set of heterogeneous
nodes, each performing a specific set of tasks associated with their role(s). Specifically, there are
four different roles: Collector Nodes, Consensus Nodes, Execution Nodes, and Verification Nodes,
which handle the collection of transactions, generating blocks, executing blocks, and verifying the
execution results, respectively. Flow allows a high level of participation in Consensus and Verifica-
tion by requiring only a high-end consumer internet connection while leveraging large-scale data
centers to operate as Execution Nodes. All types of nodes in Flow receive compensation through
crypto-economic incentives. Prior research indicates that exploiting the heterogeneity of the nodes
and taking the pipelined approach results in a throughput improvement by a multiplicative factor
of 56 [4] compared to homogeneous architectures using only full nodes. We also showed that the
decentralization and safety of the network is preserved by the Flow architecture [5].
It is worth noting that the separation of consensus from execution is done based on the sep-
aration of the subjective from objective operations. The Subjective operations are those that do
not have a deterministic result. Instead, they require a consensus to be reached over the result.
An example of a Subjective act is the set of transactions to be included in the next block. On the
other hand, the Objective operations are the ones with a deterministic result and do not require the
consensus over their result. An example of an Objective act is the execution of a transaction that
transfers some tokens between two accounts. In Flow, the separation of consensus and execution
is done by assigning the Subjective tasks to the Consensus Nodes, and the Objective tasks to the
Execution Nodes. Hence, even a few data centers may run the Execution Nodes. Nevertheless, their
computation results are deterministic, verifiable, attributable, punishable, and recoverable, and do
not compromise the decentralization of the system. We iterate over these terminologies in the rest
of this section.
1.2 Design Principles
For Flow to be secure against Byzantine failures and attacks, we identify the following core archi-
tectural principles. In this paper, by an honest actor, we mean a node that exactly follows protocol
associated with its role and never deviates from the protocol.
• Detectable: Any honest actor in the network can detect deterministic faults and prove the
fault to all other honest nodes. The proof only requires asking other honest nodes to redo the
faulty parts.
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• Attributable: For performance reasons, many tasks in Flow are assigned randomly to a group
of nodes. While the assignments are random for security reasons, it is based on Verifiable
Random Functions (VRFs) [6]. Hence, any fault upon detection is also attributable to the
responsible node(s) of the associated task.
• Punishable: Every node participating in the Flow network must put up a stake, which is
slashed when a detected fault is attributed to the node. Reliably punishing errors via slashing
is possible because all errors in deterministic processes are detectable1 and attributable.
• Recoverable: The Flow protocol contains specific elements for result verification and resolution
of potential challenges. These elements act as countermeasures against the attempts of the
malicious nodes to inject faults into the system. The probability of successfully injecting such
faults is negligible.
1.2.1 Safety and Liveness
As a distributed multi-process system, the correctness of Flow protocol sets are evaluated against
their safety and liveness [7]. A distributed multi-process system is safe against a set of features,
if it provides guarantees that those features never happen in the system, unless with a negligible
probability in some specific system parameter. Similarly, the system shows liveness respect to a
set of features, if it provides guarantees that those features always persist, unless with a negligible
probability in some specific system’s parameter. In this paper, we formally identify the liveness
and safety features of the introduced protocols. We prove Flow is safe and live in the presence of a
limited fraction of Byzantine actors in each role.
In the design of Flow, we prioritize safety over liveness in case of a network split. A network
split happens when at least a non-empty subset of nodes in the system is not accessible by rest of
the nodes. In the extremely unlikely circumstance of a large-scale network split, where no connected
subset of the network includes enough nodes to make forward progress, we allow the network to
halt. This preserves the safety of the network even in the face of intentional network disruption,
such as with an Eclipse attack [8].
1.3 Assumptions
The Flow architecture makes the following set of assumptions:
• Consensus and Authentication
– All nodes participating in the system are known to each other.
– Each node is authenticated through its unforgeable digital signature.
– To reduce the computational cost and preserve the sustainability of the system, the
consensus protocol of Flow is based on Proof of Stake (PoS).
• Participation in network
1In Flow, nodes check protocol-compliant behavior of other nodes by re-executing their work. In most cases, verifica-
tion is computationally cheap, with the noticeable exception of computing all transactions in a block. We describe
in our previous white paper the procedure of distributing and parallelizing the verification of the computation of
the blocks [5]. Hence, each Verification Node only performs a small fraction of the overall block computation.
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– The evolution of the Flow blockchain is comprised of fixed intervals2, called epochs.
– To participate in the network, a node must put up the minimum required stake for that
role in a specific epoch
– A Flow node may participate over multiple epochs.
• Source of randomness
– Flow requires a reliable source of randomness for seeding its pseudo-random number
generators.
– The source of randomness enables each seed to be unpredictable by any individual node
until the seed itself is generated and published in a fully decentralized manner.
– In Flow, we use the Distributed Random Beacon (DRB) protocol [9] to generate a fully
decentralised, reliable source of randomness.
• Cryptography Primitives
– Flow requires an aggregatable and non-interactive signature scheme, such as BLS [10].
• Network Model
– Flow operates on a partially synchronous network with message traverse time bound by
∆t and the relative processing clock of the nodes bound by φt.
– Flow uses a Byzantine Fault Tolerant message routing system, that guarantees message
delivery with a high probability.
• Rewarding and Slashing
– Flow requires adequate compensation and slashing mechanics that incentivize nodes to
comply with the protocol.
• Honest Stake Fraction
– Flow requires more than 23 of stake from Collection Nodes, Consensus Nodes, and Veri-
fication Nodes to be controlled by honest actors (for each node role separately). We will
refer to a group of nodes with more than 23 of stake as a super-majority. A super-majorities
of honest nodes probabilistically guarantees the safety of the Flow protocol.
1.4 Flow’s Roles
In Flow, roles are the services that the nodes provide to the system. One may assume each role as
a specific set of protocols that a node executes. Accordingly, in Flow, we have four different roles
(i.e., set of protocols), which are: Collector Role, Consensus Role, Execution Role, and Verification
Role. We refer to the network nodes that execute the set of respective protocols as Collector Node,
Consensus Node, Execution Node, and Verification Node. For each role, a minimum stake deposit
is required from each of the participating nodes. Hence, single hardware system may host multiple
roles in the network by staking for each of them individually. However, Flow treats individual
2We envision that the length of an epoch will be measured in the number of blocks.
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roles as if they are independent entities. In other words, each role is staked, unstaked, and slashed
independently. The staked nodes associated with the roles are compensated through a combination
of block rewards and transaction fees. Any combination of a public key and a role should be
unique, and each peer has an independent staked value for each of its roles. We also recommend
that multiple roles of a single peer do not share their staking keys for security reasons.
We present a detailed description of each node role below. A high-level illustration of the role
interactions is shown in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows an overview of the transaction’s lifecycle over
considering the different roles of the nodes.
1.4.1 Collector Role
For the sake of load-balancing, redundancy, and Byzantine resilience, the Collector Nodes are staked
equally and randomly partitioned into clusters of roughly identical size. At the beginning of an
epoch, each Collection Node is randomly assigned to exactly one cluster. Each cluster of Collector
Nodes acts as a gateway of Flow with the external world. In the mature Flow, we envision that a
cluster will contain somewhere between 20 and 80 Collector Nodes.
An external client submits their transaction to a Collector Node. Upon receiving a submitted,
well-formed 3 transaction, a Collector Node introduces it to the rest of its cluster. The Collector
Nodes of one cluster batch the received transactions into so-called collections. Only a hash reference
to a collection is submitted to the Consensus Nodes for inclusion in a block.
Each cluster of the collector nodes generates their collections one at a time. Before a new
collection is started, the current one is closed and sent to the Consensus Nodes for inclusion in
a block. The collections of a cluster are built collaboratively by each Collector Node sharing the
transactions submitted to it with the rest of its cluster, and participating in a (light) consensus
protocol with the other Collector Nodes of its cluster. The nodes come to consensus on both the end
Figure 1: An overview of the different roles in Flow as well as their interaction. For simplicity, only the message
exchange during normal operation is shown. Messages for raising or adjudicating slashing challenges are omitted.
3As we detail later in this paper, a well-formed transaction has all required fields filled properly and contains valid
signature(s) from staked account(s) of Flow
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of the current collection, to start a new one, and on the transactions included in the new collection.
The collection generated as the result of a consensus among the Collector Nodes of a cluster is
called a guaranteed collection.
1.4.2 Consensus Role
In Flow, the Consensus Nodes maintain the chain of blocks and are responsible for the chain
extension by appending new blocks. They receive hash references to the guaranteed collections
that were generated by the Collector Nodes. Furthermore, Consensus Nodes run a Byzantine Fault
Tolerant (BFT) consensus algorithm to reach an agreement over the set of collections to be included
Figure 2: The lifecycle of a transaction in Flow. The yellow hexagons indicate the start of the individual stages
in the Flow pipeline, e.g., the block sealing (i.e., Sealing Computation Results). The arrows show the inter-role
message exchange between the nodes. Green rectangles correspond to the broadcasting events, in which a message is
disseminated to all of the staked nodes. White rectangles represent the execution of the operations of the nodes. For
the sake of simplicity, we represent the normal flow of the transaction lifecycle and ignored the message exchanges
related to adjudicating slashing challenges.
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in the next block. The block of the ordered collection that has undergone the complete BFT
consensus algorithm is called finalized blocks. In Flow, a block specifies4 the included transactions
as well as the other inputs (e.g., the random seed), which are required to execute the computation.
It is worth noting that a block in Flow does not include the resulting execution state of the block
execution.
Consensus Nodes are also responsible for sealing a block. A Block Seal is a commitment to
the execution result of a block after it is executed and verified (see [5] for more details on Block
Sealing). Moreover, Consensus Nodes are responsible for maintaining a part of the state of the
system related to the stakes of the nodes, receiving and adjudicating the slashing challenges, and
slashing faulty nodes. We elaborate on the notion of protocol state on Flow in Section 1.5.
1.4.3 Execution Role
The Execution Nodes are powerful computational resources that are primarily responsible for scal-
ing the computational power of Flow. Execution Nodes execute the finalized blocks generated by
the Consensus Nodes. They publish the resulting execution state as an Execution Receipt. The
Execution Nodes also need to provide the required information to the Verification Nodes so they
can check the execution result. For this purpose, Execution Nodes break the computations of a
block into chunks. Each Execution Node publishes additional information about each chunk in its
Execution Receipt for the block executed. We detail the block formation process and chunking in
Section 4 of this paper.
1.4.4 Verification Role
Verification Nodes are responsible for collectively verifying the correctness of the Execution Nodes’
published results. With the chunking approach of Flow, each Verification Node only checks a small
fraction of chunks. A Verification Node requests the information it needs for re-computing the
chunks it is checking from the Execution Nodes. A Verification Node approves the result of a chunk
by publishing a Result Approval for that chunk, which means that the Verification Node has verified
and agrees with the result of the execution of that chunk.
Breaking the verification work into small chunks enables Verification Nodes to check the ex-
ecution of chunks independently and in parallel. However, as we formally have shown in [5], all
Verification Nodes together will check all chunks of the executed blocks with an overwhelming
probability.
1.5 States, Staking, and Slashing
State: There are two sorts of states in Flow blockchain known as the execution state and protocol
state. Each type of these states is maintained and updated independently. Both states are repre-
sented as key-value stores. While the execution state is maintained and updated by the Execution
Nodes, the protocol state is maintained and updated by the Consensus Nodes.
The execution state contains the register values, which are modified by transaction execution.
Although the updates on the execution state of the system are done by the Execution Nodes, the
integrity of the updates is governed by Flow’s verification process [5].
4A block implicitly specifies its transactions by referencing collections of transactions.
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Protocol state, on the other hand, keeps track of the system-related features including, all the
staked nodes, their roles, public keys, network addresses, and staking amounts. The protocol state
is updated when nodes are slashed, join the system via staking, or leave the system via un-staking.
Consensus Nodes publish updates on the protocol state directly as part of the blocks they generate.
The integrity of the protocol state is guaranteed by the consensus protocol. We elaborate on updates
to the protocol state, affected by the consensus protocol, in Section 4 of this paper.
Staking: A node in Flow is required to deposit some stake in order to run a role. This requires the
node to submit a staking transaction. The staking transactions for the next epoch take place before
a specific deadline in the current epoch. Once the staking transaction is processed by the Execution
Nodes, the stake is withdrawn from the node’s account balance and is explicitly recorded in the
Execution Receipt. Upon Consensus Nodes sealing the block that contains this staking transaction
they update the protocol state affected by this staking transaction, and publish the corresponding
staking update in the block that holds the seal. Staked nodes are compensated through both block
rewards and transaction fees and all roles require a minimum stake to formally participate in that
role.
Slashing: Any staked node of Flow can detect and attribute misbehavior to another staked node
who committed it. Upon detecting and attributing misbehavior, the node issues a slashing challenge
against the faulty node. Slashing challenges are submitted to the Consensus Nodes. The slashing
challenge is a request for slashing a staked node due to misbehavior and deviation from the protocol.
As the sole entity of the system responsible for updating the protocol state, Consensus Nodes
adjudicate slashing challenges and adjust the protocol state (i.e., staking balances) of the faulty
nodes accordingly. Based on the result of adjudication, the protocol state (i.e., the stake) of a node
may be slashed within an epoch. The slashing update is announced in the subsequent blocks and
is effective for all honest nodes as soon as they process the block containing the respective stake
update.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Adversarial Model
We denote the honest nodes (i.e., non-Byzantine nodes) as the ones that follow the description of
the Flow protocols. We call a node Byzantine if it deviates from any of Flow’s protocols at any
arbitrary point. We also presume the non-responsiveness of a staked node, to messages and queries,
to be a Byzantine act.
Definition 2.1 Effective Votes
During the consensus among a group of nodes, we consider the effective votes of the nodes as
the overall staked fraction of the nodes who vote positively in favor of the consensus proposal. The
fraction is taken over the entire stakes of the nodes in that group.
For the Collector Role, Consensus Role, and Verification Role, we assume that more than 23
of the accumulated stake of each role belong to the honest nodes, and the rest is owned by the
Byzantine nodes. For example, more than 23 of the stakes of the Collector Nodes belong to the
honest ones and less than 13 of their overall stakes are owned by the Byzantine ones.
2.2 HotStuff
HotStuff [11, 12] is a distributed Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus algorithm. In this
subsection, we present a summary of the basic HotStuff protocol. However, we scope out the opti-
mization improvements which are presented in the HotStuff proposal for sake of brevity, and refer
the interested readers to [12].
HotStuff assumes the nodes as state machines that hold the same shared replicated data (e.g.,
the blockchain ledger), and aim to reach consensus over the transition of the next state of the
replicated data (e.g., the set of the transactions to be included into the next block). HotStuff is live
under partially-synchronous network conditions. It is safe if less than one third of the consensus
nodes’ total stake is controlled by Byzantine actors.
The protocol progresses in rounds, i.e., each node increments a local counter when reaching
consensus, or a timeout. For sake of liveness, the nodes double their timeout interval each time
they move to a new round as the result of a time out. In each round, a unique consensus node
assumes the role of the leader. Nodes can consistently identify the leader of each round by invoking
a deterministic function locally on the round number. The leader advances the consensus via a
three-phase commit protocol of prepare, pre-commit, and commit. The consensus at each round
starts with a block proposal by the leader, and ends with reaching a consensus over the proposal or
a timeout. In Flow, we assume that moving from one phase to another phase of HotStuff requires a
minimum effective vote of 23 in favor of progressing with the leader’s proposal. The leader collects
and aggregates the votes and broadcasts the aggregated signature to the entire system as a proof of
moving to the next phase. Hence, each node can track and verify the correctness of the consensus
progress in each phase by confirming that there are at least 23 effective votes.
The correctness of the HotStuff protocol is formally proven via the safety and liveness theorems
[12]. The safety implies that all honest nodes will eventually commit the same state transitions
(i.e., blocks) in the same order. The liveness property of HotStuff guarantees that, after a Global
Synchronization Time has passed, there is a bounded interval that enables an honest leader to ad-
vance the round towards reaching a consensus. Furthermore, HotStuff provides deterministic finality,
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i.e., the protocol guarantees that there will be no forks in the chain of committed state transitions.
This essentially means that the canonical chain of replicated state transitions (e.g., the ledger of
blocks) solely acts as an append-only chain. Hence, in contrast to many existing consensus protocols
(including Bitcoin’s Proof-of-Work (PoW)), chain reorganizations do not occur in HotStuff5.
The advantages of using HotStuff compared to the existing BFT leader-based counterparts include
• Having n nodes participating in the consensus, the communication complexity of HotStuff is
O(n), which makes switching of faulty or non-responsive leaders relatively easy.
• The proposal of a failed or timeout leader has the potential to be resumed by the leader of
the next round.
• Preferring safety over the liveness, i.e., the safety over HotStuff is guaranteed regardless of
the underlying synchrony model. However, for the protocol to guarantee its liveness and the
progress, the Global Synchronization Time should be passed.
• Ability to operate under partially-synchronous network conditions.
• It has the so-called responsiveness property, i.e., an honest leader advances the protocol to
the consensus in a time that is bounded by the message transmission delay, i.e., ∆t.
• It has deterministic finality.
2.3 Distributed Random Beacon
In Flow, we utilize the Distributed Random Beacon (DRB) protocol [9] among a subset of nodes
to generate an unbiased and verifiable source of randomness in a fully decentralized manner. By
unbiased, we mean that no adversarial party can manipulate the source of randomness towards its
desired distribution. By verifiability, we mean that once the source of randomness is determined,
it is verifiable against the correct execution of the protocol. As a decentralized protocol, DRB is
executed collaboratively among a subset of nodes as an interactive multi-party protocol.
In Flow, we consider DRB as a 2-phase protocol consisting of three polynomial time protocols:
Setup, RandomGenerator, and Verify. The first phase of DRB is the setup phase that happens
only once among the participants. The second phase of DRB is the random generation phase, which
is a repetitive operation, i.e., it may happen many times within the lifetime of the system. Each
time the participants enter the random generation phase, they generate a random string that is
denoted as the source of randomness. In this paper, we call every single execution of the random
generation phase of DRB a DRB round.
• (VG, ski)← Setup(Pi, 1λ): Setup is a probabilistic decentralized protocol where each partici-
pating party i receives its private key, i.e., ski, as well as a public verification vector, i.e., VG.
We elaborate on these in the rest of this section.
• r ← RandomGenerator(ski, proto(b)): RandomGenerator is a deterministic decentralized
protocol where parties collaboratively generate a fresh source of randomness. For each par-
ticipating party in this protocol, the inputs are the party’s private key (i.e., ski) and a proto
5Provided that the stake controlled by Byzantine actors is strictly less than 1
3
.
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block (i.e., proto(b)). The output of the protocol is the fresh source of randomness, i.e., r. We
elaborate on the proto block notion in Section 4 of this paper.
• Verify(r, proto(b), VG) = True/False: Verify is a deterministic protocol that is executed
locally by any external or internal party to DRB. Knowing a generated source of randomness
(i.e., r), its associated proto block (i.e., proto(b)) and the public verification vector of the
DRB (i.e., VG), one can deterministically verify the correctness of the protocol execution.
In addition to being unbiased, DRB provides the following properties:
• Unpredictability: Denoting the security parameter of the system by λ, before the execution
of a new round of DRB, for each probabilistic polynomial-time predictor A, there exists a
negligible function negl(λ), such that:
Pr[A(r1, r2, r3, ..., rx−1, proto(b1), proto(b2), proto(b3), ..., proto(bx−1), proto(bx)) = rx]
≤ negl(λ)
where ri is the output of the i
th execution of DRB, and proto(bi) is the associated proto block
to the ri. In other words, given all the generated entropies as well as their associated proto
blocks to the predictor A, it is not able to predict the output of the next round before its
execution unless with a negligible probability in the security parameter of the system.
• Verifiability: Given the generated source of randomness of a round, its corresponding proto
block, as well as some public metadata of the protocol, any external party to the protocol
can verify the generated source of randomness.
2.3.1 DRB Random Generation Phase (Threshold Signatures)
The main idea of DRB is based on the existence of a deterministic and unique non-interactive
threshold signature protocol. BLS signature primitive [10] provides all these required properties. A
threshold signature is a tuple of four polynomial-time algorithms known as (Gen, Sign, Recover,
Verify), which is defined over the set G of n parties (i.e., G = {P1, P2, ..., Pn}) and is identified by
two parameters: t and n. An (t, n)-threshold signature enables the set of n parties to collaboratively
generate an aggregated signature over a message m using a distributed secret key in a decentralized
manner. The threshold signature enables any entity to efficiently verify a valid signature over
m against the distributed secret key. The verification is solely done by verifying the aggregated
signature, without requiring the individual party’s signatures.
• (VG, sk1, sk2, ..., skn) ← Gen(1λ): Gen is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that on
receiving the security parameter, it implicitly generates a secret key skG and distributes
individual key shares over the participating parties i.e., ski for the i
th party. skG remains
secret and not explicitly computed although it is jointly generated by all parties. Moreover,
a public verification vector VG is generated. VG enables parties to recover each others’ public
key shares. By the public key of the ith party, we mean the public key pki associated with
ski. VG also contains the public key of the group of parties, i.e., pkG associated with skG.
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• σi ← Sign(ski,m): Sign is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that is executed by
each party individually. On receiving a message m and the private key of the ith party (i.e.,
ski), Sign(ski,m) generates a signature σi on the message m that is attributable to the i
th
party. σi is also commonly called the threshold signature share of the i
th party. Sign is
the same signature function defined in the BLS signature scheme.
• σ ← Recover(Pi1 , Pi2 , ..., Pit+1 , σi1 , ..., σit+1): Recover is a deterministic polynomial-time al-
gorithm that is executed by any entity either internal or external to the group of parties.
On receiving the distinct threshold signature shares σik and the list of corresponding distinct
parties, Recover combines all the signature shares and recovers the group signature, i.e., σ.
Having any combination of more than t signature shares of the parties over the same message
m, Recover generates a group signature σ that is attributable to the group secret key, i.e.,
skG.
• Verify(σ, pkG,m) = True/False: Verify is a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that
is executed by any entity either internal or external to the group of parties. On receiving a
recovered threshold signature (i.e., σ) on a message m, it returns True if the signature σ was
generated using the group secret key (i.e., skG), and returns False otherwise. Verify is the
same signature function defined in the BLS signature scheme.
While Sign, Recover and Verify are non-interactive and relatively inexpensive operations, Gen
requires to run an interactive and relatively slow protocol by all parties. Keeping the performance
factor in mind, Gen is separated from the repetitive DRB random generation phase in Flow. Gen
serves as the Setup phase while the tuple (Sign, Recover, Verify) serves as the random genera-
tion phase. This is possible because the random generation allows generating repetitive signatures
using skG without explicitly reconstructing it, and therefore protecting its confidentiality. The
DRB random generation phase is started every time the nodes need to generate a new source of
randomness. Protocol 1 shows a DRB random generation round for a specific proto block, i.e.,
proto(b). To generate a new source of randomness, each node i computes and broadcasts a thresh-
old signature share over proto(b). Upon receiving at least t+ 1 distinct threshold signature shares
{σb,1, σb,2, σb,3, ..., σb,t+1} over the proto block, any party can aggregate the signatures into a thresh-
old signature σb, using the function Recover. If the signature σb is correctly formed, it is verifiable
against the public key of the group G, i.e., Verify(σr, proto(b), pkG) = True. The source of ran-
domness of this DRB random generation round is σb. The deterministic digest of σb is used to seed
the pseudo-random generators during the current round.
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Protocol 1 DRB Random Generator
Inputs: For each i ∈ [1, n], party Pi holds the inputs of proto(b) and ski. H is a cryptographic hash
function.
Goal: Parties jointly compute a fresh source of randomness, r, based on proto(b).
The protocol:
1. Each party Pi generates σb,i ← Sign(proto(b), ski), and broadcasts σb,i to all other parties.
2. Any internal or external party then captures the broadcasted σb,j
3. Upon having at least t + 1-many σb,. from t + 1 distinct parties, each party recovers the
aggregated threshold signature r = σb ← Recover(Pi1 , ..., Pit+1 , σb,i1 , ..., σb,it+1).
4. Having r = σb, any party extracts a fresh seed as H(r)
In Flow, we use [13] as the underlying threshold signature scheme for the DRB, which is non-
interactive and provides unique signatures. By non-interactive, we mean that the protocol is mod-
eled by a single round of communication. Uniqueness is an inherited property from the BLS scheme,
and it means that there exists a unique aggregated threshold signature for each pair of (pkG,m).
Hence, the aggregated threshold signature is deterministic and is always the same regardless of
the subset of collected threshold signature shares over the same message. The non-interactiveness
feature is for sake of improvement on the communication complexity of the DRB protocol over sev-
eral instances (i.e., rounds) of execution. The uniqueness is vital to guarantee a consistent source
of randomness independent of the subset of threshold signature shares, i.e., every valid subset of
t+ 1-many threshold signature shares results in the same aggregated threshold signature.
2.3.2 DRB Setup Phase (Distributed Key Generation)
Distributed Random Beacon (DRB) setup phase is to generate the keys for the threshold signature
protocol. As shown by Protocol 2, the setup phase of DRB in Flow is mainly the Gen function
of the threshold signature. During this phase, the parties of the group G collaboratively execute
a Distributed Key Generation protocol (DKG) [14] as the decentralized implementation of Gen
function. The DKG implicitly generates a group secret key skG. As the result, each party Pi
receives the public verification vector VG as well as its individual private key ski. The secret key
skG is generated using entropy provided by all participating parties in an unbiased manner. It
remains unknown to all participants although it can be reconstructed by any party receiving more
than t shares of the secret key.
The DKG implemented in Flow is a variant of Pedersen’s protocol called Joint-Feldman [14]
protocol. It is a Discrete Logarithm-based protocol and mainly constitutes of n parallel executions
of the Feldman verifiable secret sharing (VSS) protocol with each party acting as a leader in exactly
a single instance. Although it has been proven that Joint-Feldman protocol does not guarantee a
uniform distribution of the secret key skG, the security of the DKG in Flow is based on the hardness
of the Discrete Logarithm Problem, which is not weakened by the distribution bias.
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Protocol 2 DRB Setup
Inputs: For each i ∈ [1, n], party Pi holds its index in the set as well as the system’s security
parameter, λ.
Goal: Parties jointly compute a public verification vector VG as well as their threshold signature
private keys, i.e., ski for Pi.
The protocol:
1. Each party Pi invokes an instance of DKG protocol as specified in [14], and obtains:
(VG, ski)← DKG(Pi, 1λ)
2.4 Distributed Random Beacon Setup in Flow
We assume the setup phase of DRB happens once every epoch to prepare the DRB protocol keys.
During the setup phase, a protocol-selected subset of ns Consensus Nodes jointly execute the DRB
setup protocol. Through executing the setup protocol, each node i generates its DRB private key
ski for the threshold signature as well as a public verification vector VG.
As explained in Section 2.3, (n, t) are the parameters of the threshold signature scheme. An
adversary who corrupts up to t parties is not able to forge a valid threshold signature. It is also
required that at least t+ 1 parties act honestly to guarantee the liveness of the protocol. In order
to satisfy both properties with the high probability, i.e unforgeability and liveness, we compute t
as follows.
t = bns − 1
2
c (1)
In Flow, the size of the DRB committee ns is tuned to ensure that unforgeability and liveness are
guaranteed with a high probability in the security parameter of the system (i.e., λ). However, ns
also is chosen small enough to preserve the efficiency of the DRB execution with respect to the
operational complexities.
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3 Collection Formation
3.1 Overview
In Flow, collection formation denotes the process which starts with a user agent submitting a trans-
action to the Collector Nodes and ends when a guaranteed collection is submitted to the Consensus
Nodes. The Collector Nodes are partitioned into clusters. Each transaction is assigned to a certain
cluster based on its transaction hash. A user agent submits a transaction to some Collector Nodes
in the responsible cluster. On receiving a transaction, the Collector Nodes of the cluster broadcast
the transaction among each other. Collector Nodes of a cluster continuously form consensus over
the set of transactions contained in the collection under construction. As a result of the consensus,
a collection grows over time. Once one of two conditions is met: either the collection size reaches
a threshold or a pre-defined time span has passed, the collection is closed and submitted to the
Consensus Nodes for inclusion in a block.
3.2 Cluster Formation
In Flow architecture, the stake is a measure of the nodes’ accountability. In specific for the Collector
Nodes, the workload accountability of processing the submitted transactions and hence their com-
pensation is a monotonically increasing function of their stake deposit per processed transaction.
To make all the Collector Nodes equally accountable, we desire a setup where the stake deposit
per processed transaction is similar for all the Collector Nodes. This setup with similarly staked
Collector Nodes results in a similar workload distribution among them on processing the submitted
transactions. This setup stands against the non-uniform stake distribution of the Collector Nodes,
which results in a non-uniform workload of processing the submitted transactions among them.
Despite our equally staked Collector Nodes principle, the user agents submitting their transac-
tions to an arbitrary Collector Node of their choice results in a biased distribution of the workload
and its associated rewards. It is trivial that over the time the user agents may establish a rela-
tionship with Collector Nodes, e.g., running the client software provided by the Collector Nodes,
submitting to the Collector Node that provides a better quality of service, etc. This, however, leads
to a heterogeneous load distribution on the Collector Nodes and degrades the decentralization of
the system. For example, a Collector Node may provide significantly higher utilization than the
others, attract more rewards and essentially starve other Collector Nodes of income.
To design a system where the stake deposit per processed transaction is comparable for all
collectors, Flow introduces the notion of clusters. Several Collector Nodes are grouped into the
same cluster to collect and process the same set of transactions. In other words, instead of having a
pool of transactions where each Collector Node arbitrarily selects transactions to process, there is
a one-way deterministic assignment between each transaction and a cluster of the Collector Nodes
using the source of randomness. Clustering of Collector Nodes is done at the beginning of each
epoch, e.g., once every week. The number of clusters in Flow is a protocol parameter denoted by c.
As the result of clustering, the Collector Nodes are randomly partitioned into c clusters. Clustering
is done in a way that the size of each two different clusters varies by at most a single node. The
assignment is nevertheless verifiable, i.e., each node is able to run the clustering algorithm offline
and reach the same cluster assignment for the Collector Nodes as every other node. As we detail
in the rest of this section, this enables the user agents to efficiently map their signed transactions
to the cluster of the Collector Nodes that is responsible for processing them.
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The clustering is done by each Collector Node running the cluster assignment algorithm as
illustrated by Algorithm 3.1. The inputs to this algorithm are the list of all Collector Nodes’
public keys (i.e., Nc), the number of clusters (i.e., c), and the source of randomness (i.e., r), which
is generated by the Distributed Random Beacon protocol [9] (see Section 2.3). We denote the
cardinality of Nc as nc, which corresponds to the number of Collector Nodes in the system. The
output of the algorithm is Cls, which is a map from the public keys of the Collector Nodes to their
assigned clusters, i.e., for every pk ∈ Nc, element Cls[pk] is the Collector Node’s assigned cluster
id.
The clustering is done by deriving a seed s from the source of randomness r solely for the
clustering of Collector Nodes (Algorithm 3.1, Line 1). The seed is derived in a deterministic man-
ner and has the same entropy as r. The derived seed is then being utilized by the Fisher-Yates
shuffling algorithm [15]. On receiving the seed s and the list of Collector Nodes’ public keys Nc,
the Fisher-Yates algorithm turns Nc into a pseudo-random permutation of Collector Nodes’ public
keys, denoted by pic. Note that as pic is a permutation of Nc, it is of the same cardinality as Nc,
i.e., |Nc| = |pic| = nc (Algorithm 3.1, Line 2).
Once the permutation pic is determined, the clustering algorithm partitions the Collector Nodes
into c clusters. It does that by clustering the first k Collector Nodes into the cluster number 0, the
second k Collector Nodes into the cluster number 1, and similarly the ith sequence of the Collector
Nodes of size k into the cluster number i − 1. k is the size of each cluster and is determined as
k := bncc c (Algorithm 3.1, Lines 3-10).
In case the number of Collector Nodes is a multiple of the number of clusters, i.e., bncc c =
nc
c = dncc e = k, clustering algorithm stratifies the Collector Nodes based on their position in the
permutation pic into c clusters of size k. Otherwise, if the number of Collector Nodes is not a
multiple of the number of clusters, clustering based on Lines 3-10, results in some Collector Nodes
to be leftover (Specifically, the number of leftover Collector Nodes will be less than c). In that
situation, the clustering algorithm does not create an extra cluster to accommodate the leftovers.
It rather distributes the leftovers among the existing clusters by adding the ith Collector Node of
the leftovers to the ith cluster. Size of the leftovers in this case is nc mod c, i.e., the remainder of nc
divided by c. Hence, clustering in this manner results nc mod c clusters of k+1 Collector Nodes, and
c− nc mod c clusters of k Collector Nodes (Algorithm 3.1, Lines 11-15). Having nc Collector Nodes
in the system, Algorithm 3.1 has both an asymptotic time and memory complexity of O(nc), and
does not impose a communication overhead to the system.
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Algorithm 3.1: ClusterAssignment
Input:
Nc: List; element Nc[i] is public key of i
th Collector Node
c: System-wide constant unsigned integer; number of the clusters
r: byte array; Source of randomness
Output:
Cls: Map; element Cls[pk] is the cluster id of Collector Node with public key of pk
// Deriving a random seed from r for clustering Collector Nodes
1 s := H(‘collector’||‘cluster’||r);
// Shuffling the collectors list
2 pic := FisherYates(s,Nc);
// k defines the size of clusters
3 k := bncc c;
// i keeps current cluster’s id
4 i := 0;
// j keeps current Collector Node’s index in pic
5 j := 0;
// stratifying Collector Nodes into c clusters of size k
6 while j < c× k do
// adding jth Collector Node to cluster i
7 Cls[pic[j]] := i;
// moving to the next Collector Node
8 j + +;
9 if j mod k = 0 then
// current cluster has reached size k
// moving to the next cluster
10 i+ +;
11 i := 0;
12 while j < nc do
// adding jth Collector Node to cluster i
13 Cls[pic[j]] := i;
// moving to the next cluster
14 i+ +;
// moving to the next Collector Node
15 j + +;
3.3 Transaction submission
Listing 1 represents the structure of the Flow’s transactions that the user agents submit to the
Collector Nodes. In this listing, Script corresponds to the content of the transaction. The trans-
action’s content manipulates the execution state of Flow, and requires a transaction fee to be
processed. PayerSignature corresponds to the signature created by the account that is paying
the transaction fee (e.g., the gas fee). The ScriptSignature of the transaction corresponds to the
signatures of the execution state owners, which grant the transaction permission to manipulate
their execution state. A transaction may manipulate several parts of the execution state and hence
may require the signatures of several execution state owners. ReferenceBlockHash points to the
hash of a previous block, which is used to provide a deadline for the transaction to be processed.
Each submitted transaction must be processed within a limited window of blocks, e.g., the height
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difference between the block that the transaction’s ReferenceBlockHash points to and the block
that the transaction appears in should be less than a predefined parameter. For example, assume
that the window size for the transactions is 10 blocks and a transaction is pointing to a block at
height 1000 in its ReferenceBlockHash. This means that the transaction can only be processed
between blocks of height 1001 and 1010. Otherwise, the transaction is invalid.
Let h denote hash of the SignedTransaction, interpreted as an unsigned integer. To submit its
transaction, the user agent determines the cluster of the Collector Nodes that are responsible for
collecting its transaction. The collection determination is done as shown by Equation (2), where
c corresponds to the number of clusters in the system. The index of the cluster, to which the
transaction with hash h should be submitted to is
ch = h mod c . (2)
Here, mod is the modulus operation that determines the remainder of the integer-division of the
left-side operand over the right-side operand.
In Flow, the assignment of Collector Nodes to clusters is easily computed in a deterministic
fashion by executing Algorithm 3.1. Hence, a user agent can efficiently map its signed transaction to
a cluster of the Collector Nodes using Algorithm 3.1 and Equation (2). The transaction submission
is done by the user agent sending its signed transaction to the cluster with index ch that is driven
by Equation (2). By sending a transaction to a cluster, we mean sending to at least one of the
Collector Nodes belonging to that cluster. However, for sake of fault tolerance in the presence of
Byzantine Collector Nodes as well as (network) failures, a user agent may send the same transaction
to several Collector Nodes of the assigned cluster. In Flow, we leave the number of Collector Nodes
that a user agent needs to submit its transaction as a user-dependent decision. A user with a strong
set of utilities may prefer to send all or only its important transactions to the entire cluster, while
another user may prefer to submit it only to a single node of the assigned cluster. Upon receiving
a transaction from a user agent, the Collector Node checks whether the transaction is submitted
to the correct cluster according to Equation (2) as well as whether the transaction is well-formed.
A transaction is well-formed if it contains all the fields as shown by Listing 1 as well as valid
ScriptSignature(s) and PayerSignature by the registered accounts of Flow. If the transaction
is well-formed as well as submitted to the right cluster, the Collector Node broadcasts the signed
transaction to the entire cluster.
Listing 1: User agent broadcasts the transaction to multiple Collector Nodes of the assigned cluster.
1 message SignedTransaction {
2 bytes Script;
3 bytes PayerSignature;
4 repeated Signature ScriptSignature;
5 bytes ReferenceBlockHash;
6 }
3.4 Collection Formation
In Flow, the term collection refers to an ordered list of one or more hashes of signed transactions.
Collector Nodes form collections by coming to consensus on the ordered list of transaction hashes.
As discussed in Section 2.2, Flow uses HotStuff [11, 12] as the consensus protocol among the
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Collection Node clusters, for them to form collections. However, any BFT consensus protocol with
deterministic finality would apply to the architecture. In each round of consensus, the selected
leader either resumes an uncompleted or time-outed proposal of the previous round or makes a new
proposal. A proposal is either on appending a list of the signed transactions’ hashes to the current
collection or on closing the current collection and starting a new empty collection. For each phase
of the consensus to proceed a minimum effective vote of 23 on the leader’s message is required.
For a Collector Node to vote in favor of an append proposal, the following conditions must all be
satisfied:
• The Collector Node has received all the signed transactions that their hashes represent are
reflected in the append proposal.
• Each of the transaction hashes represented in the append proposal should be well-formed and
signed by at least one of the Collector Nodes of the same cluster.
• Appending the transactions from the proposal to the collection should not result in duplicate
transactions.
• There should not be common transactions between the current collection under construction
and any other collection that the cluster of the Collector Node has already guaranteed.
Once a message has the minimum effective vote of 23 , the leader aggregates the signatures associated
with the individual votes which advances the consensus process to the next phase. In this way, every
individual Collector Node can verify the correctness of the consensus process in a fully decentralized
manner.
Initially, a new empty collection is created as a shared replicated state in every Collector Node.
Upon reaching a consensus over an append operation, the signed transactions’ hashes are appended
to the collection. Once the collection size reaches a protocol’s predefined threshold, a non-Byzantine
leader of the subsequent rounds propose closing the collection. Consensus over the closing a col-
lection is done by following the HotStuff protocol. The structure of a Guaranteed Collection is
presented in Listing 2, where CollectionHash is the hash of the closed collection. ClusterIndex is
the id of the cluster (see Algorithm 3.1) that has generated the collection, reached a consensus over
and closed it. AggregatedCollectorSigs holds the aggregated signatures of the Collector Nodes
that have guaranteed the collection. For the GuaranteedCollection to be considered as valid,
AggregatedCollectorSigs should contain at least 23 effective votes of the Collector cluster. We
call each of the Collection Nodes that participate in making a guaranteed collection, a guarantor
of that collection. By singing a collection, a guarantor attests to the followings:
• All the transactions in the collection are well-formed.
• They will store the entire collection including the full script of all transactions.
In Flow, we consider a guaranteed collection to be an immutable data structure. The guaranteed
collection is broadcasted by the guarantors to all Consensus Nodes for inclusion in a block.
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Listing 2: Each Collector Node broadcasts the guaranteed collection reference to all the Consensus Nodes.
1 message GuaranteedCollection {
2 bytes CollectionHash;
3 uint32 ClusterIndex;
4 Signature AggregatedCollectorSigs;
5 }
3.5 Liveness
We introduce Lemma 3.1 before presenting the safety theorem of the collection formation process,
and directly utilize it as part of the proof for the safety of the collection formation process.
Lemma 3.1 Given a guaranteed collection that is generated by a set of guarantors in a cluster
with the following conditions:
• Network Model: partially synchronous network with message traverse time-bound by ∆t and
the relative processing clock of the nodes bound by φt
• Message Delivery: a fault-tolerant message routing functionality that guarantees the mes-
sage delivery with high probability
• Stake Distribution: all the Collector Nodes are equally staked
• Honest Behavior: the honest actors follow the protocols as specified, and maintain their
availability and responsiveness in the system over time
• Honest Lower-bound: the guaranteed collection has at least one honest guarantor
The guaranteed collection is always available and recoverable in the system.
Proof of Lemma 3.1: As detailed in Section 3.4, the guarantors of a guaranteed collection main-
tain the original copy of it, and only broadcast the collection reference that is presented as a
GuaranteedCollection to the Consensus Nodes. In other words, a guaranteed collection is supposed
to be replicated on all of its guarantors, i.e., the Collector Nodes that signed it. By contradiction,
assume that the original content of a guaranteed collection is not recoverable. This would imply
the occurrence of at least one of the following:
• None of the collection’s guarantors are available or responsive.
• The message delivery to and from the collection’s guarantors is compromised by an attack,
e.g., Routing Attack.
• There is no time-bound on the message delivery to and from the collection’s guarantors.
• There is no time-bound on the processing clock of the collection’s guarantors.
As following the Honest Lower-bound assumption, there exists at least one honest Collector
Node among the guarantors, having none of the collection’s guarantors responsive or available
contradicts the Honest Behavior assumption of the lemma stating the necessity on the honest
22
actors to maintain their availability and responsiveness. Having the message delivery concerning
the guarantors under attack contradicts the Message Delivery assumption of this lemma on the
guaranteed message delivery to and from the guarantors. Having no bound on the processing clock
of guarantors or the message delivery to and from them contradicts the Network Model assumption
of the lemma. Hence, we conclude that as long as there exists at least one honest guarantor for
a guaranteed collection under the assumptions of Lemma 3.1, the collection remains available,
accessible, and recoverable.

Theorem 3.2 (Collection Text Availability)
Given a system with the following properties:
• Network Model: a partially synchronous network with message traverse time bound by ∆t
and the relative processing clock of the nodes bound by φt. Each node is assumed to have a
proper defence and protection against network attacks (e.g. Denial-of-service attacks).
• Message Delivery: a fault-tolerant message routing functionality that guarantees the mes-
sage delivery with high probability
• Stake Distribution: equally staked Collector Nodes
• Byzantine Fraction: more than 23 of Collector Nodes’ stakes are controlled by honest actors
• Honest Behavior: honest actors follow the protocols as specified, and maintain their avail-
ability and responsiveness in the system over time
There exists a configuration of Flow where each guaranteed collection is available with a high prob-
ability.
Proof of Theorem 3.2:
In our previous white paper [5], we have shown that by having nc = 1040, 1/3 of these nodes
being Byzantine, and our typical cluster size of [50, 80] nodes, the probability of having a Byzantine
cluster is very unlikely.
Despite Flow’s proactive architectural setup for maintaining the availability of the collections,
Flow also introduces a reactive mechanism (i.e., Missing Collection Challenge6) to confirm and slash
the Byzantine actors attributed to a missing collection [5].
Theorem 3.3 (Liveness of Collection Formation)
Given a system with the following properties:
• Network Model: a partially synchronous network with message traverse time-bound by ∆t
and the relative processing clock of the nodes bound by φt
6The analysis of the Missing Collection Challenge in [5] (specifically Proof of Theorem 3 therein) is more extensive
than the proof presented here. Here, we assume that an honest actor will diligently but unsuccessfully query all
guarantors for the desired collection before raising a Missing Collection Challenge. The analysis in [5] also covers
the case of a lazy or trolling requester, which might query a subset of the guarantors and raise a challenge if the
queried subset does not respond.
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• Message Delivery: a fault-tolerant message routing functionality that guarantees the mes-
sage delivery with high probability
• Stake distribution: equally staked Collectors Nodes
• Byzantine fraction: more than 23 of Collector Nodes’ stakes are controlled by honest actors
• Honest Behavior: the honest actors follow the protocols as specified, and maintain their
availability and responsiveness in the system over time
the collection formation always progresses.
Proof of Theorem 3.3: By contradiction, assume that there is an unknown point of time tstop
for which the collection formation process as described in this section stops working for all points
of time t > tstop. By collection formation being stopped, we mean that there is absolutely no single
collection formed by any of the clusters of Collector Nodes once tstop elapses. This implies at least
one of the following situations applies to the system by elapsing tstop, which results in none of the
clusters being able to reach a consensus over closing their collection:
• Less than 23 of the Collector Nodes of every cluster are honest.
• The message delivery to a fraction of at least 23 of Collector Nodes of each cluster is compro-
mised by an attack, e.g., Routing Attack.
• There is no time-bound on the message delivery to and from a subset of at least 23 of the
Collector Nodes in each cluster.
• There is no time-bound on the processing clock of at least 23 of Collector Nodes of each cluster.
Following the Honest behavior and Stake distribution assumptions of the theorem, having less
than 23 honest Collector Nodes contradicts the Byzantine fraction assumption of the theorem.
Likewise, compromising the message delivery to a fraction of at least 23 of the Collector Nodes on
each cluster contradicts the Message Delivery assumption of the theorem. Finally, having no bound
on either the message delivery time to or the processing time of at least 23 of Collector Nodes in
each cluster contradicts the Network Model assumption of the theorem. Hence, we conclude that
as long as the assumptions of the theorem hold, the collection formation progresses.
It is worth mentioning that, as discussed earlier, we envision it is rare for a Byzantine cluster
to exist. Such a cluster may aim at compromising the liveness of the system by ignoring all the
submitted transactions to that cluster. Nevertheless, upon detecting an attack on liveness by a user
agent, the agent may simply try to switch the corresponding cluster of its transaction by changing
some metadata of its transaction, e.g., changing the transaction’s ReferenceBlockHash (see Listing
1). This minor change results in the transaction’s cluster assignment changing and so, it can be
routed to a (non-Byzantine) cluster (see Equation (2)) and hence processed towards inclusion in a
collection.
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4 Block Formation
4.1 Overview
Block formation is a continuous process executed by consensus nodes to form new blocks. The block
formation process serves multiple purposes:
• Including the newly submitted guaranteed collections and reaching agreement over the order
of them.
• Providing a measure of elapsed time by continuously publishing blocks and determining the
length of an epoch.
• Publishing result seals for previous blocks of the chain. A block’s result is ready to be sealed,
once it is finalized by the Consensus Nodes, executed by the Execution Nodes, and the exe-
cution result is approved by the Verification Nodes (see [5] for more details).
• Publishing slashing challenges and respective adjudication results.
• Publishing protocol state updates, i.e., slashing, staking, and unstaking. Whenever a node’s
stake changes, the Consensus Nodes include this update in their next block.
• Providing a source of randomness (see Section 2.3 for more details).
In an unlikely event of no new guaranteed collection, consensus nodes continue block formation
with an empty set of collections. In other terms, block formation process never gets blocked.
The block-formation process utilizes the underlying round-base consensus protocol we de-
scribed in Section 2.2. In Flow, we distinguish between ProtoBlocks and (proper) Blocks, which
are formally defined in section 4.2 below. The BFT consensus algorithm generates and finalizes
ProtoBlocks. The only difference between a ProtoBlock and a (proper) Block is that a ProtoBlock
does not contain any source of randomness. The source of randomness in a Block is required for
various processes in Flow, including deterministically generating pseudo-random numbers during
transaction execution, assigning collectors to clusters, etc. Hence, ProtoBlocks cannot be processed
by nodes other than consensus nodes due to the lack of source of randomness.
After a ProtoBlock is generated by the BFT consensus protocol, the Distributed Random
Beacon (DRB) nodes sign the ProtoBlock. Their threshold signature over the ProtoBlock is the
Block’s source of randomness. The ProtoBlock plus the DRB’s signature together form the (proper)
Block. While the Random Beacon is run by a set of consensus nodes, generating the randomness
is not part of the consensus process. Instead, the source of randomness is added in a subsequent
step to generate a proper Block.
4.2 Data Structures
ProtoBlocks
The BFT consensus algorithm works on the level of ProtoBlock. In each round, a consensus node
is selected as primary, whose main task is to collect signatures for the last ProtoBlock and propose
the next ProtoBlock. Once a ProtoBlock is proposed, the Consensus Nodes vote for its inclusion in
the finalized chain. The structure of a well-formed ProtoBlock is specified in Listing 3. We provide
definitions for the ProtoBlock’s individual fields below.
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Listing 3: Flow’s proto block structure
1 message ProtoBlock {
2 bytes previousBlockHash;
3 uint64 height;
4 repeated GuaranteedCollection guaranteedCollections;
5 repeated BlockSeal blockSeals;
6 SlashingChallenges slashingChallenges;
7 ProtocolStateUpdates protocolStateUpdates;
8 }
• previousBlockHash points to the hash of the immediate predecessor of this block on the
chain. By pointing to the previous block, blocks form a blockchain.
• height corresponds to the current index of the block in the chain. Formally, the block chain
forms a tree with the blocks as vertices. The height of a block is the depth of the respective
vertex in the tree.
• guaranteedCollections is an ordered list of new guaranteed collections that are introduced
by this block. As explained in Section 3, a guaranteed collection includes the hash value of
the transactions in the collection, but not the transactions themselves. The transaction texts
are stored by the Collector Nodes, who guaranteed the collection, and provided by them upon
request.
• blockSeals is a list of hash commitments to the verified execution results of the previous
blocks. Sealing a block happens after the submission of a minimum effective vote of 23 of
the block’s result approvals from the Verification Nodes to the Consensus Nodes, with no
challenges are pending. Check out our previous paper [5] for more details on execution and
verification.
• slashingChallenges is the list of new slashing challenges that have been submitted to the
Consensus Nodes for adjudication. Any staked node can submit slashing challenges against
another node in the Flow network. For example, Verification Nodes may submit slashing
challenges against the computation result of the Execution Nodes.
• protocolStateUpdates contains a cryptograpic commitment to the updated protocol state
of the system as a result of executing this block. In Flow, all the staked nodes follow recently
finalized blocks to update their view of the system and progress with their roles. Moreover,
publishing this information in the blocks also acts as a public bulletin board of the changes
in the system state.
• aggregatedConsensusSigs contains the aggregated signatures of the Consensus Nodes that
voted in favor of this block.
Blocks
The structure of a well-formed Block is presented by Listing 4. It contains commitments to all
necessary information for progressing with transaction computation and evolving the protocol state
in a deterministic manner. However, from a data perspective, a Block is not self-contained. For
example, while cryptographic hashes of the execution state are included, the state data itself is
not. This implies that anyone can verify the integrity of any subset of the execution state using the
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Listing 4: Flow’s block structure
1 message Block {
2 ProtoBlock protoBlock;
3 Signature sourceOfRandomness;
4 }
hashes in the Block (and merkle proofs which must be provided alongside the actual data).
Essentially, a Block is simply a wrapper around a ProtoBlock, which adds the sourceOfRandomness
to the block. Formally, the source of randomness is a reconstructed threshold signature from the
DRB Nodes (see Section 2.3 for details.)
4.3 Block formation process
Flow requires that all Consensus Nodes follow the same protocol when responding to events. We
describe the block formation process steps from the perspective of a Consensus Node which we
denote by this. A Consensus Node can hold two separate secret keys:
• skstakethis is used for staking.
• If the Consensus Node is a member of the DRB, it has a second secret key skDRBthis which is
used for generating the node’s threshold signature shares.
For the node this in the Flow network, its role, public staking key pkstakethis , current stake amount,
and the node’s network IP address ip addrthis are known to all other nodes. Furthermore, if the
node is a member of the DRB committee, also its public key pkDRBthis is publically known.
4.3.1 Block Proposal
Following Flow’s underlying consensus protocol, Consensus Nodes are selected as primaries with a
probability proportional to their stake using a probabilistic but verifiable protocol. The Consensus
Node selected as the primary of the current round has to propose the next ProtoBlock pb. It
includes the guaranteed collections, block seals, slashing challenges, protocol state updates, and
a commitment to the protocol state after the updates. Subsequently, it broadcasts the proposed
ProtoBlock pb to all other Consensus Nodes. As a security measure, the underlying consensus
protocol has a timer to detect the primary’s failure. If the primary does not generate a block within
this time, the Consensus Nodes progress to the next round and primary.
As mentioned earlier, if there are no guaranteed collections available, the primary should produce
a ProtoBlock pb with an empty list of guaranteed collections (i.e., b.guaranteedCollections = ∅),
but still include the potential block seals, protocol state updates, challenges, adjudications, etc.
It is worth noting that the Consensus Nodes only work with and decide upon the order of the
collection hashes but not the full collection texts. Hence, they do not need to inspect the collections’
transactions unless an execution result is being challenged [5].
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4.3.2 Block Proposal Evaluation and Voting
After the primary broadcasts its ProtoBlock, the rest of Consensus Nodes evaluate the proposal
and vote. Each Consensus Node follows the consensus steps for this round (see Section 2.2), if
it approves the proposed ProtoBlock. Each Consensus Node runs Protocol 3 and only votes in
favor of a ProtoBlock if all the listed conditions are satisfied. In Protocol 3, we denote the current
Consensus Node as ‘this’.
Protocol 3 Flow Consensus Protocol
Input
A proposed ProtoBlock pb
Procedure
Check these conditions:
1. pb’s proposer is the selected primary of this round and pb is signed by this node.
2. pb extends the known blockchain and is a descendent of the genesis block (without missing
blocks).
3. pb is safe to vote on according to the rules of the consensus protocol.
4. pb.guaranteedCollections contains a set of new guaranteed collections or is empty.
5. this has received all guaranteed collections in pb.guaranteedCollections.
6. All the guaranteed collections in pb.guaranteedCollections are authenticated (as defined
in section 3.4).
7. this has received all block seals in pb.blockSeals.
8. All the block seals in pb.blockSeals are valid according to the conditions in [5].
9. this has received and verified all slashing challenges in pb.slashingChallenges.
10. Apply the protocol state updates listed in pb to the final protocol state of the parent block
(referenced by pb.previousBlockHash). Verify that the resulting protocol state matches the
commitment in the block pb.
If all of these conditions are satisfied, vote in favour of pb.
4.3.3 Finalizing a ProtoBlock
Consensus Nodes sign a ProtoBlock to indicate their approval. In the current architecture of Flow,
we implement HotStuff, which is a BFT consensus algorithm with deterministic finality. However,
without loss of generality, any other consensus algorithm that is BFT and has deterministic finality
is suitable. In HotStuff, a ProtoBlock is finalized when there are three ProtoBlocks built on top
of it. In order to build on top of a ProtoBlock, HotStuff requires more than 23 effective votes from
Consensus Nodes for it. The safety of the HotStuff protocol guarantees that never two or more
competing blocks are finalized.
4.3.4 Source of randomness Attachment
In Flow, a reliable and verifiable randomness is essential for the system’s Byzantine fault tolerance.
The sourceOfRandomness field of a Block is used by Flow nodes to seed multiple pseudo-random-
number generators. To provide a reliable source of randomness, Flow’s DRB closely follows Dfinity’s
proposal [9]. Protocol 4 specifies the steps for generating the source of randomness for a ProtoBlock.
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Participating Consensus Nodes follow a two-step procedure to compute sourceOfRandomness for a
given block. First, they sign the hash of the ProtoBlock and share their signatures with the other
DRB nodes. Second, a DRB node waits for the signature shares from other DRB members. Upon
having more than t distinct threshold signature shares over the hash of the ProtoBlock, each DRB
node can recover the full threshold signatures over the hash for the ProtoBlock. The threshold
signature is the source of randomness of the block and its digest is used to seed the pseudo-random
generators. Once the source of randomness is ready, a DRB node broadcasts the (proper) Block to
the entire network. In Protocol 4, we denote the current Consensus Node as ‘this’.
Protocol 4 Flow Distributed Random Beacon steps
Input
A ProtoBlock pb
Procedure
1. Step 1: Sign the proto block
(a) σthis ← Sign(Hash(pb), skDRBthis)
(b) Broadcast σthis to all DRB nodes.
2. Step 2: Wait for (t+ 1)-many distinct threshold signature shares σi1 , σi2 , ..., σit+1
(a) σ ← Recover(Pi1 , Pi2 , ..., Pit+1 , σi1 , σi2 , ..., σit+1) (see Section 2.3)
(b) create Block b with b.sourceOfRandomness = σ and b.protoBlock = pb
(c) broadcast b to the entire network
4.4 Protocol State Updates
For each block, one may view the protocol state as a key-value dictionary. A key in the protocol
state corresponds to the public staking key pkstake of a node. The corresponding dictionary value
stores all of the node’s properties. Relevant properties for a staked node include the node’s role, its
staking amount, and its DRB key (if applicable). The way Flow maintains its protocol state is akin
to the way Ethereum handles its state:
• The protocol state is directly maintained by the Consensus Nodes (which compare to miners
in Ethereum).
• Each block contains a commitment to the resulting protocol state after all protocol state
updates in the block have been applied.
Changes in the protocol state of a block propagate to the children of this block. Hence, the protocol
state is a relative concept that is evaluated with respect to a base block. For example, having two
consecutive blocks A and B where B is the immediate child of A, one must evaluate the correctness
of the protocol state updates as a transition from block A to B. If there are forks in the unfinalized
part of the chain, the protocol state might be different in the forks.
The protocol state of a node may change due to slashing, staking, and unstaking. Any staked
node can submit a slashing challenge against another node. The slashing challenges are adjudicated
by the Consensus Nodes, and the protocol state of a node may change accordingly. For each epoch,
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there is a certain block height (i.e., protocol-determined parameter) before which all new staking
requests for the next epoch must be submitted as transactions. We envision that in mature Flow
this block height is set such that the staking period ends about one day (approximately 80 000
blocks) before the new epoch.
To stake, an actor submits a staking transaction which includes its public staking key. Once the
staking transactions are included in a block and executed by the Execution Nodes, a notification
is embedded into the corresponding Execution Receipt. When sealing the execution result, the
Consensus Nodes will update the protocol state of the staking nodes accordingly.
For unstaking, a node submits a transaction signed by its staking key. Once an unstaking
transaction is included in a block during an epoch, it discharges the associated node’s protocol
state as of the following epoch. The discharged stake of an unstaked node is effectively maintained
on hold, i.e., it can be slashed but it is not returned to the unstaked node’s account. The stake
is returned to the unstaked node after a waiting period of at least one epoch. The reason for
doing so is two-fold. First, detecting and adjudicating protocol violations might require some time.
Hence, some delay is required to ensure that there is enough time to slash a misbehaving node
before its stake is refunded. Second, to prevent a long-range attack wherein a node unstakes, and
then retroactively misbehaves, e.g., a Consensus Node signing an alternative blockchain to fork the
protocol.
4.5 Adjudicating Slashing Challenges
Consensus Nodes adjudicate slashing challenges and update the protocol state accordingly. On re-
ceiving a slashing challenge from a node (the ‘challenger’) against a challenged node, the Consensus
Nodes include it into a block. This is done to embed an official record of the slashing challenges
in the blockchain. In case the challenge contains a full proof, the Consensus Nodes adjudicate it
right away. Otherwise, they wait for the challenged node to reply accordingly. If the challenged
node does not reply within a timeout, it is slashed right away. Otherwise, if the challenged party
responds with data required to adjudicate the challenge, the Consensus Nodes process the data and
slash whomever (i.e., challenger or challenged node) that is at fault. In both cases, the Consensus
Nodes publish the adjudication result in the next block together with the protocol state updates.
The stakes of the nodes are affected as the result of the updates.
4.6 Correctness Proof
HotStuff [11, 12] is at the heart of Flow’s Consensus Protocol 3. Flow only imposes some additional
requirements on the validity of blocks, which the HotStuff protocol is agnostic to. Therefore, the
safety of Flow’s consensus protocol follows from HotStuff’s safety. We formalize this insight in the
following Corollary 4.0.1.
Corollary 4.0.1 (Safety) Given a system with:
• Network Model: partially synchronous network with message traverse time-bound by ∆t and
the relative processing clock of the nodes bound by φt
• Message Delivery: a fault-tolerant message routing functionality that guarantees the mes-
sage delivery with probability close to 1.
30
• Byzantine Fraction: more than 23 of Consensus Nodes’ stakes are controlled by honest
actors
• Honest Behavior: the honest actors follow the protocols as specified, and maintain their
availability and responsiveness in the system over time
• Consensus Protocol: the Consensus Nodes follow HotStuff, which is a BFT consensus
protocol with deterministic finality
Under these prerequisites, Protocol 3 is safe against arbitrary behaviour of Byzantine nodes. Specifi-
cally, Byzantine actors cannot introduce errors by deliberately publishing or voting for faulty blocks.
Furthermore, the consensus Protocol 3 has deterministic finality.
HotStuff [11, 12] is a general-purpose BFT consensus protocol which is agnostic to the payload
contained in the block. In other words, the detailed structure of the block payload as well as the
corresponding validity requirements do not affect liveness of HotStuff as long as an honest Primary
has the ability to always propose a block. In Flow’s Consensus Protocol 3, there are no hard
requirements on the amount of content a Primary has to put in the block. An honest Primary
will only include valid content, or propose an empty block. Therefore, liveness of Flow’s Consensus
Protocol 3 is also immediately follows from HotStuff, as stated in the following Corollary 4.0.2.
Corollary 4.0.2 (Liveness) Given a system with:
• Network Model: partially synchronous network with message traverse time-bound by ∆t and
the relative processing clock of the nodes bound by φt
• Message Delivery: a fault-tolerant message routing functionality that guarantees the mes-
sage delivery with probability close to 1
• Byzantine Fraction: more than 23 of Consensus Nodes’ stakes are controlled by honest
actors
• Honest Behavior: the honest actors follow the protocols as specified, and maintain their
availability and responsiveness in the system over time
• Consensus Protocol: the Consensus Nodes only vote on ProtoBlocks if they are safe ac-
cording to the rules of the HotStuff consensus protocol
Under these prerequisites, Protocol 3 is live, i.e., the protocol will continue to finalize valid blocks.
31
5 Execution
Execution Nodes follow the new blocks as they are published by the Consensus Nodes. A conser-
vative7 Execution Node only processed finalized blocks to avoid wasting resources on unfinalized
blocks, which might be abandoned later. While only Consensus Nodes actively participate in con-
sensus, all other nodes still verify for themselves that a block is finalized according to the criteria
of the BFT consensus protocol.
5.1 Overview
As illustrated by Figure 3, in Flow, the execution process is triggered when the Consensus Nodes
broadcast evidence that the next block is finalized. It completes when the Execution Nodes broad-
cast their Execution Receipts. The Execution Nodes are responsible for receiving a finalized block,
executing its transactions, and updating the execution state of the system. During this process each
Execution Node takes the following steps:
• Retrieves each collection of transactions that appeared in the finalized block from the relevant
clusters.
• Executes the transactions according to their canonical order in the finalized block and updates
the execution state of the system.
Figure 3: Lifecycle of a transaction from collection until the execution. The yellow hexagons indicate the start of the
individual stages in the Flow pipeline, e.g., the block sealing (i.e., Transactions Collection). The arrows show the
inter-role message exchange between the nodes. Green rectangles correspond to the broadcasting events, in which a
message is disseminated to all of the staked nodes. For the sake of simplicity, we represent the normal flow of the
transaction lifecycle and ignored the message exchanges related to adjudicating slashing challenges.
7The Flow protocol allows Execution Nodes to compute unfinalized blocks. This might allow the Execution Nodes to
gain more revenue in an incentive model that specifically rewards speed of execution. However, such an optimistic
Execution Node risks investing resources for computing blocks which are abandoned later. Furthermore, in contrast
to finalized blocks, the BFT consensus algorithm does not guarantee the validity of unfinalized block proposals.
Hence, an optimistic Execution Node must protect itself against processing invalid blocks.
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• Builds an Execution Receipt for the block, i.e., a cryptographic commitment on the execution
result of the block
• Broadcasts the Execution Receipt to Verification and Consensus Nodes.
We elaborate on each of these steps in the rest of this section. For the sake of simplicity, we describe
the process from the perspective of a single Execution Node. In the live system, the Execution Nodes
operate completely independently from each other and execute the protocol in parallel.
5.2 Collection Retrieval
A guaranteed collection, as listed in the block (compare Listing 2), only contains a hash of the set
of transactions that it represents but not their full texts. As explained in Section 3, the Collector
Nodes that sign a guaranteed collection are also responsible sending its full text to other nodes
upon request.
Once an Execution Node confirms for itself that a block is finalized (see Section 4), it asks
each cluster for their respective collection text so it can begin processing the transactions in order.
If the responsible guarantors do not provide a guaranteed collection, a node can issues a Missing
Collection Challenge against the guarantors. The challenge is submitted directly to the Consensus
Nodes. Missing Collection Challenges are discussed in detail in the third Flow Technical Paper [5].
When an Execution Node retrieves the transactions for a guaranteed collection, it reconstructs
the collection’s hash in order to verify that the transaction data is consistent with the guaranteed
collection. Provided verification succeeds, a collection is considered successfully recovered.
5.3 Block Execution
An Execution Node computes a finalized block b, when the following conditions are satisfied:
• The execution result of the previous block to b (the one referened by b.previousBlockHash)
is available from either the Execution Node itself or from another Execution Node.
• All guaranteed collections in b.guaranteedCollections have been successfully recovered.
Alternatively, the Execution Node has a Missing Collection Attestation, which allows it to skip
a lost collection (details are discussed in detail in the third Flow Technical Paper [5]).
Once the Execution Node has computed block b, it broadcasts an Execution Receipt to Verification
and Consensus Nodes. Listing 5 shows the Execution Receipt’s message format. In addition to the
Execution Node’s signature executorSig, an Execution Receipt has two types of data structures:
an Execution Result (field executionResult), and a Specialized Proof of Confidential Knowledge
(SPoCK) (field Zs). We detail each of these in the following sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2.
Listing 5: Structure of an Execution Receipt in Flow. It consists of two primary data structures: an ExecutionResult
and one or more SPoCK(s).
1 message ExecutionReceipt {
2 ExecutionResult executionResult;
3 repeated SPoCK Zs;
4 bytes executorSig;
5 }
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5.3.1 Execution Result
An Execution Result for a block b represents a commitment from an Execution Node to the in-
terim and final states of computing the block b. As shown by Listing 6, an Execution Result for
a block contains the block hash (blockHash), hash reference to the previous Execution Result
(previousExecutionResultHash), one or more chunks (chunks), and a commitment to the final
execution state of the system after executing this block (finalState).
The previousExecutionResultHash acts as a commitment to the starting execution state for
executing the block. It allows tracing an execution error back to the actor that originally introduced
it. Figure 4 shows an example of this case. It is worth noting that this linked sequence of Execution
Results could be called ”a chain”, but we avoid the word in order to avoid confusion with the
primary ”block chain” maintained by the Consensus Nodes. Also, as shown by Listing 6 each
Execution Result has a hash reference to the block that it is associated with. However, we skip the
inclusion of the block references in Figure 4 for the sake of simplicity. Once a Verification Node
attributes a computation fault to an Execution Node, it issues a Faulty Computation Challenge (FCC)
against the faulty Execution Node. Verification of Execution Results and adjudicating the FCCs
are covered in detail in our other white paper [5].
Figure 4: The previousExecutionResultHash field of the Execution Results enables identifying and slashing the ma-
licious Execution Nodes that originally injected an error into the system, instead of punishing the honest ones that
only propagate the error. In this figure, the gray rectangles represent the correct Execution Results, and the red ones
represent a faulty Execution Result. The arrows correspond to previousExecutionResultHash references, i.e., the Ex-
ecution Result on the right side of an arrow takes its initial execution state from the result of the left one. The faults in
the Execution Results that are generated by the honest Execution Node-3 are attributable to the malicious Execution
Node-2 that initially injected them into its own Execution Result. In other words, previousExecutionResultHash of
the Execution Results provides a chain of attributability that enables the Verification Nodes to trace back the errors,
and identify and slash the malicious Execution Node-2 that originally introduced the error instead of punishing honest
Execution Node-3 that only propagated the error.
Execution Results consist of one or more chunks. Chunking is the process for dividing a block’s
computation so such that the resulting chunks can be verified in a distributed and parallelized
manner by many Verification Nodes. The execution of the transactions of a block is broken into a
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set of chucks. The chunking is done based on the computation consumption of the transactions, and
in a way that the overall computation consumption of the transactions of chunks be similar to each
other and do not exceed the system-wide threshold of Γchunk. Homogeneity of the chunks computa-
tion consumption is a security countermeasure against the injected faults in the computation-heavy
chunks. In other words, if the computation consumption of the chunks is heterogeneous, the Veri-
fier Nodes of the computationally heavier chunks may not be able to finish the verification before
the sealing of the actual block associated with those chunks [5]. This enables the malicious Ex-
ecution Nodes to attack the integrity of the system by injecting a computational fault into the
computationally heavy chunks, which are likely to be left out of verification.
The structure of a chunk is represented by Listing 6, where startStateCommitment denotes
a hash commitment to the execution state of the system before the execution of the chunk.
startingTransactionCC and startingTransactionIndex are the computation consumption and
the index of the chunk’s first transaction. computationConsumption denotes the overall computa-
tion consumption of the chunk. The chunking convention is: computationConsumption ≤ Γchunk.
Listing 6: Structure of an Execution Result and Chunk in Flow
1 message ExecutionResult {
2 bytes blockHash;
3 bytes previousExecutionResultHash;
4 repeated Chunk chunks;
5 StateCommitment finalState;
6 }
7 message Chunk {
8 StateCommitment startStateCommitment;
9 float startingTransactionCC;
10 uint32 startingTransactionIndex;
11 float computationConsumption;
12 }
5.3.2 Specialized Proof of Confidential Knowledge (SPoCK)
The SPoCK is Flow’s countermeasure against Execution Nodes copying Execution Results from each
other instead of computing the block on their own. Also, SPoCKs are used to prevent Verification
Nodes from blindly approving execution results without doing the verification work. SPoCKs are
detailed in [5], but it is sufficient for the purposes of this paper to understand that SPoCKs are cryp-
tographic commitments, which are generated as part of the verification process to indicate that the
Verification Node has done its job. Essentially, a SPoCK is a commitment to the execution trace for
a single chunk. The field ExecutionRecipt.Zs is a list of SPoCKs, where ExecutionRecipt.Zs[i]
is the SPoCK for the ith chunk. It is worth emphasizing that ExecutionRecipt.Zs[i] can be gen-
erated by only executing the ith chunk.
5.3.3 Execution Algorithm
Algorithm 5.1 represents the BlockExecution algorithm that an Execution Node invokes individ-
ually for executing a block. The inputs to this algorithm are a finalized block b, which is ready for
the execution, the hash of the previous Execution Receipt herprev , and the execution state of the
system before the execution of the block b, i.e., Λ. The output of the algorithm is an Execution
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Receipt for block b, which is denoted by erb. The algorithm is invoked as follows:
erb = BlockExecution(b, herprev ,Λ)
The Execution Node processes the transactions referenced by block b in their canonical order.
As shown by Figure 5, for the proto block associated with block b, the canonical order of the
transactions is achieved by first sorting its guaranteed collections in the same order as they appear
in the proto block, and then for each collection, sorting its transactions in the same order as the
collection references. The first transaction of the first collection, and the last transaction of the
last collection are then the first and last transactions of block b based following the canonical
ordering, respectively. To resolve the canonical order of the transactions associated with block b,
the Execution Node invokes the function canonical(b). The execution of each transaction ti is
done by invoking the execute function, where ti is the i
th transaction of the block b following its
canonical order. On receiving the current execution state of the system Λ and the transaction text
ti, the execute function returns the resulting execution state, the computation consumption of ti,
Figure 5: The canonical order of the transactions in a proto block with ω transactions is shown in red. The transactions
with the canonical orders of 1 and ω are the first and last transactions in the sequential execution order of the
proto block, respectively. The tick arrow corresponds to the inclusion relationship, i.e., a proto block includes several
guaranteed collections. The dashed arrows correspond to the referential relationship, i.e., each guaranteed collection
holds a reference to a collection of several transactions.
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i.e., τ , and an SPoCK for the execution of ti, i.e., ζ (Algorithm 5.1, Line 9). BlockExecution keeps
track of the computation consumption of the current chunk by aggregating the overall computation
consumption of the executed transactions since the start of the current chunk (Algorithm 5.1, Line
22).
For each transaction ti, the Execution Node checks whether the current chunk’s total computa-
tion consumption would exceed the threshold Γchunk when transaction ti is added. If the threshold
is not met, the transaction is considered as part of the current chunk, and the SPoCK of the current
chunk (i.e., ζ˜) is updated by the SPoCK trace of ti’s execution (Algorithm 5.1, Line 23).
Otherwise, if the threshold Γchunk is reached for the inclusion of the transaction ti in the current
chunk, the Execution Node closes the current chunk without including ti. Accordingly, the trans-
action ti is taken as the first transaction of the next chunk. To exclude transactions without the
need for reverting, the BlockExecution algorithm keeps track of the execution state by Λ˜. Closing
the current chunk is done by generating a commitment for the starting state of the chunk, which
is tracked by Λstart, and casting the chunk attributes into a Chunk message structure.
The commitment for the start state is generated by Flow’s Authenticated State Proof system,
which provides three deterministic polynomial-time functions:
• StateProofGen
• ValueProofGen
• ValueProofVrfy
StateProofGen(Λstart) returns a verifiable hash commitment startStateCommitment to a given
state snapshot Λstart. Formally, Flow’s execution state Λ is composed of key-value pairs. The key
r can be thought of as the memory address and the value v the memory content. As only a
small fraction of state values (i.e., key-value pairs) are touched in a chunk, it would be ineffi-
cient to transmit the full state to the Verification Node. Instead, Execution Nodes transmit only
the key-value pairs that are needed for checking their computation. In addition, an Execution
Node also provides a proof to allow the Verification Node to check that the received key-value
pairs are consistent with the state commitment in the chunk. The Execution Node generates these
proofs by running γx := ValueProofGen(Λstart, rx). Here, rx denotes the key for an element of the
state and vx the corresponding value. The Execution node sends the (rx, vx, γx) to the Verification
Node. The recipient can then verify that the values are indeed from the desired state by execut-
ing ValueProofVrfy(rx, vx, γx, startStateCommitment). We leave the details of the Authenticated
State Proof scheme as well as its construction to our future publications. Once the commitment
to the starting state of the current chunk is ready, BlockExecution creates a new Chunk message
(see Listing 6). The generated chunk is appended to the list C, which holds the chunks of the block
under execution. The SPoCK ζ˜ for the generated chunk is stored in the list Zs, which holds the
SPoCKs for the chunks of the block. Once the current chunk is closed, the algorithm moves to the
next chunk by re-initializing the variables that keep the attributes of the current chunk (Algorithm
5.1, Lines 12-21). τ0 keeps track of the computation consumption of the first transaction of the
current chunk.
Once all transactions of the block b are executed in their canonical order and the corresponding
chunks were created, BlockExecution creates an Execution Receipt (erb) out of the hash of the
block b (hb), the hash of the previous Execution Receipt (herprev), the list of all the chunks of block
b (C), the execution state of the system after executing block b (Λ), and the respective SPoCKs
(Zs). The execution of block b ends by each Execution Node individually broadcasting erb to the
entire system.
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Algorithm 5.1: BlockExecution
Input:
b: finalized block
herprev : hash of the previous Execution Receipt
Λ: execution state of system prior to execution of b
Output:
erb: Execution Receipt of block b
// initializing the SPoCK list of the Execution Receipt
1 Zs := [ ];
// initializing the list of chunks for block b
2 C := [ ];
// initializing start state of the current chunk
3 Λstart := Λ;
// initializing starting transaction index of current chunk
4 startTransactionIndex := 0;
// initializing computation consumption of the current chunk
5 c := 0;
// initializing the SPoCK of the current chunk
6 ζ˜ := ∅;
7 for ti ∈ canonical(b) do
// caching the state prior to execution of ti for chunk bookkeeping
8 Λ˜ := Λ;
9 Λ, τ, ζ := execute(Λ, ti);
10 if i = 0 then
11 τ0 := τ
12 if c+ τ > Γchunk then
// closing the current chunk
13 startStateCommitment := StateProofGen(Λstart);
14 chunk := new Chunk(startStateCommitment, τ0, startTransactionIndex, c);
15 C.append(chunk);
16 Zs.append(ζ˜);
// initializing the variables for the next chunk
17 Λstart := Λ˜;
18 startTransactionIndex := i;
19 τ0 := τ ;
20 ζ˜ := ∅;
21 c := 0;
22 c := c+ τ ;
// Updating the execution trace of the current chunk
23 ζ˜ := TraceUpdate(ζ˜, ζ);
// closing the last chunk
24 startStateCommitment := StateProofGen(Λstart);
25 chunk := new Chunk(startStateCommitment, τ0, startTransactionIndex, c);
26 C.append(chunk);
27 Zs.append(ζ˜);
28 erb := new ExecutionReceipt(hb, herprev , C,Λ, Zs)
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5.4 Correctness Proof
For completeness, we include the following safety Theorem 5.1. For further details and the formal
proof, the reader is referred to [5].
Theorem 5.1 (Safety) Given a system with:
• Network Model: a partially synchronous network with message traverse time-bound by ∆t
and the relative processing clock of the nodes bound by φt
• Message Delivery: a fault-tolerant message routing functionality that guarantees the mes-
sage delivery with high probability
• Honest Behavior: honest actors which follow the protocols as specified and maintain their
availability and responsiveness in the system over time
• Byzantine Fraction: at least one honest Execution Node
Even if all but one Execution Nodes are Byzantine and publishing the same faulty result, the faulty
result is not sealed with a probability greater than 1 −  with   1. Depending on its system
parameters, Flow can be tuned such that  ≤ 10−12. The system parameters are: the number of
chunks in a block and the fraction of chunks of a block that each Verifier Node checks.
Assuming that there is at least one honest Execution Node in the system, a valid execution receipt
will be published for each block. As HotStuff guarantees liveness of block formation, liveness of exe-
cution receipt generation is also guaranteed. We formalize this statement in the following Corollary
5.1.1.
Corollary 5.1.1 (Liveness) Given a system with:
• Network Model: a partially synchronous network with message traverse time-bound by ∆t
and the relative processing clock of the nodes bound by φt
• Message Delivery: a fault-tolerant message routing functionality that guarantees the mes-
sage delivery with high probability
• Honest Behavior: honest actors follow the protocols as specifiedand maintain their avail-
ability and responsiveness in the system over time
• Byzantine Fraction: at least one honest Execution Node
The liveness block execution is guaranteed as the honest Execution Node(s) follow the specified
algorithms and eventually, generate an Execution Receipt for the input block.
39
6 Mitigating Attack Vectors
6.1 Byzantine Clusters
In mature Flow we envision clusters will be comprised of 20-80 randomly selected Collector nodes.
While the probability for sampling a cluster with too many Byzantine nodes is small, it is unfor-
tunately not negligible. A Byzantine cluster may attack the integrity of the system by injecting
faulty transactions in their guaranteed collections. It also may attack the liveness of the system by
withholding the text of a guaranteed collection, to prevent the Execution Nodes from computing a
block. The former attack on the integrity of the system is mitigated following the detectability and
attributability design principle of Flow, i.e., the guarantors of a collection containing malformed
transactions are slashed. The latter attack on the availability of collections is mitigated by intro-
ducing the Missing Collection Challenges (see [5] for details). This challenge is a slashing request
against the Collector Nodes that originally guaranteed the availability of the missing collection.
The challenge is directly submitted to the Consensus Nodes for adjudication.
6.2 Faulty Computation Result
A malicious Execution Node may publish faulty Execution Receipts. However, we formally prove
in [5] that faulty execution results are detected and challenged by the Verification Nodes with
overwhelming probability. Upon detection of such faulty execution results, a Verification Node
submits a slashing challenge against the faulty Execution Node to the Consensus Nodes (see [5] for
more details).
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